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During the two decades after the Cold War, interactions between the peripheries of the
former Soviet bloc and their neighboring regions activated to the extent that what can be
called the New Border Regions emerged. To analyze this phenomenon, the paper proposes
a new methodology – cultural geopolitics. While classic geopolitics focused on military,
economic, and other material resources exploited by sovereign states (modern empires),
cultural geopolitics highlights cognitive crafting by transnational actors, such as religious
organizations, transborder nationalities, transnational corporations, and NGOs. Cultural
geopolitics exploits the achievements that recent empire and religion studies have made.
Cultural geopolitics facilitates the understanding, for example, of the Black Sea Rim region
as a typical New Border Region.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.The purpose of this essay1 is to identify a new object
of area studies after the Cold Wardthe New Border
Regions (hereafter, NBRs) of Eurasiadand to propose
a methodology to analyze itdcultural geopolitics. After
identifying these concepts, I brieﬂy describe what can be
regarded as subgenres of cultural geopolitics, that is,
empire and religion studies. The last section of this
chapter is dedicated to the Black Sea Rim as an example
of an NBR. Since this paper is based on what I have
conceptualized through my participation in the 21st
Century COE Program, ‘‘The Making of Slavic Eurasian
Studies: Meso-Areas and Globalization’’ (hereafter,
Program-21), which enjoyed ﬁnancial support from the2008, responding to
ly beneﬁted from the
rence, ‘‘Eurasianness
at Hanyang Univer-
Research Center, Hanyang UniverJapan Ministry of Education during 2003–2008, a natural
start to my discussion would be a brief overview of the
objectives and results of this program. During the 1990s,
many scholars believed that once the coercive frame-
work of socialism and the Warsaw Treaty Organization
disappeared, there could be no extensive regional iden-
tity combining, for example, Turkmenistan with the
Czech Republic. Former socialist studies seemed to split
endlessly into Russian, Ukrainian, Baltic, Caucasian,
Central Asian, and other studies. Even Baltic studies
could not stand for the near lack of specialists with
a command of the three local languages. It is true that
this split/particularization of the previously single
academic discipline produced a number of merits, the
ﬁrst of which was high requirements for local languages
and expertise, as well as differentiated programs for
graduate education in regional studies, inconceivable
until the 1980s. A negative consequence of this partic-
ularization was a decline of the comparative and macro-
regional perspective, which could not but be accompa-
nied by theoretical stagnation. During the 1990s, area
specialists of Slavic Eurasia seemed to be satisﬁed with
being consumers of theories, who seldom tried to give
feedback from their empirical knowledge to the theo-
retical disciplines of the social sciences and humanities.sity. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer review under
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excessive particularization of the former socialist studies so
that these studies would soft-land to a loosely integrated
discipline called ‘‘Slavic Eurasian studies.’’ As a theoretical
background, we criticized the static demarcation and
conceptualization of geographic areas, based on their
alleged internal homogeneity, such as Europe, Asia, and
Eurasia. We argued that areas (mega-areas) were
conglomerates of meso-areas, which are signiﬁcantly
distinguishable from each other even within the same
mega-area. With this qualiﬁcation, areas expand, shrink,
split, and merge through vertical integration between
mega- and meso-areas, as well as through horizontal
interactions between meso-areas (Ieda, 2005).
During the period of Program-21, this constructivist,
cognitive, and non-primordial understanding of areas
became dominant not only in Japan,2 but also worldwide.
Perhaps this is one of the reasons that leading Slavic
associations (such as the ICCEES and AAASS) and research
institutes (such as the Davis Center at Harvard University,
the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the
Russian and Eurasian Studies Center at Oxford University,
and the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University)
largely continue to cover the former socialist territories as
their object of research, even if they changed their names
after the demise of socialist regimes.
Unsurprisingly, academic discussion continues. For
example, Serhii Plokhy criticizes our concept of Slavic
Eurasia as a revision of interwar Eurasianism, noting:
‘‘Eurasia is little more than a new name for the territory of
the USSR, manifesting an attempt by specialists trained in
Russian and Soviet area studies to stake out their pre-1991
territory under a more up-to-date and politically correct
designation.’’ Plokhy argues that Ukraine belongs to
Eastern Central Europe or Mitteleuropa, rather than Eurasia
(Plokhy, 2007, 42). This view seems more or less persuasive
in regard to early modern Ukraine, when Ukraine was
actually a border region between the East Slavic/Eurasian
and Polish/Lithuanian traditions. Along with Plokhy
himself, Yaroslav Hrytsak provides a brilliant interpretation
of Ukrainian history as a component of Central Europe
(Hrytsak, 2005).3 As far as the study of contemporary
Ukraine is concerned, however, I do not know of any
example where a political scientist specialized in Poland,
let alone Germany, France, or Scandinavian countries
widened his/her scope to include Ukraine and produced
internationally recognizable results. This requaliﬁcation
has happened, unfortunately, to the former Russia
specialists or political scientists with a post-Sovietology
background.4 I do not represent here the primordial view2 For example, a leading specialist in Chinese politics in Japan, Kazuko
Mouri, formulates this cognitive change in area studies as ‘‘from homo-
geneity to relations’’ (Mouri, 2007).
3 Unfortunately, it has not been well known that Japan has an inﬂu-
ential Mitteleuropa school. See Hayashi (2007), Numano (2007), and
Shinohara (2007), and other chapters in the same collection.
4 Excellent examples are Henry Hale and Oxana Shevel. Moreover,
those who started as Ukraine specialists, such as Lucan A. Way, continue
to produce analytic concepts by comparing this country with its
Northern/Eastern, not Western, neighbors (Levitsky & Way, 2007).that Ukraine, ‘‘by nature,’’ is closer to Russia than to Poland.
But one should not ignore the fact that post-Orange
Ukraine, as was exactly the case with Ukraine under
Kuchma, continues to be a country more understandable
for those who know Russia or Belarus than those who are
familiar with Central Europe. When this situation changes,
the grouping of area specialists will change, too.
By the same token, I do not know of successful examples
in which specialists of Western Europe expanded their
scope to incorporate the Baltic or Visegrad countries,
though quite a few researchers and research institutes
currently classify these countries as a subregion of Europe.
Linguistically, it is much easier for those who have
a command of Russian to learn Ukrainian or Polish than for
Germany specialists to do so. On the other hand, however,
we have not found a name for the region to replace the
retrospective designation of ‘‘former socialist countries.’’
Despite the SRC’s vigorous publications, conferences, and
seminars, the word ‘‘Slavic Eurasia’’ continues to sound
somewhat artiﬁcial. The quest for the very deﬁnition of this
area will not be accomplished in the foreseeable future.
Program-21 foundan importantdriving force for regional
reconﬁguration in post-communist Eurasia in activating
political, economic, cultural, and strategic interactions
between the peripheries of the former Soviet Bloc and its
neighboring territories. These interactions took place, for
example, between (1) East Central Europe and the European
Union, (2) the Baltic countries/Russian Northwest and the
Nordic countries, (3)Central Eurasia andSouthwestAsia (the
so-called Near East), (4) Central Asia and Sinkiang of China,
and (5) the Russian Far East and Northeast Asia. Recent
explorations of the Northern Polar Sea by Russia and the
territorial debate between the countries fronting this sea
should be regarded as another example of this regional
reconﬁguration. The activation of these transborder inter-
actions surpassed the level that we had expected at the
beginning of Program-21, and we came to the conclusion
that the peripheries of the former Soviet Bloc and the
neighboring territories are beingmerged into a groupof new
regions namable as the NBRs (see the map).
Because of the emergence of the NBRs, the characteristics
of both the former socialist peripheries and their neigh-
boring regions changed drastically. The Russian Far East
cannot exist without mutual dependence on Northeast
Asia. Shanghai, being a foothold of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization, is becoming a bridgehead to Eurasia. The
Caucasus used to be a periphery of the Soviet Union, but
this region is now like a magnetic ﬁeld in which Russian,
Turkish, and Iranian inﬂuences compete, even putting aside
6 There has been an honorable academic tradition among Orientalists
of knowing many languages often belonging to different families, but
emerging NBR studies have universalized this practice.
7 For example, Robert D. Crews, who published a serious monograph
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to be by chance that the ﬁrst large-scale international
conference focused on the South Ossetian conﬂict (August
2008), in which Russian, Georgian, Eurasian, and Western
scholars took part, was held in Tehran in November 2008.5
Turkey inﬂuences the Caucasus and Central Asia through its
Islamic and ethnic Turkic networks, and thus reminds us of
the pivotal role that the Ottoman Empire used to play in
three continents. During the Cold War, Eastern Central
Europe and the Baltic countries could easily demonstrate
their raison d’eˆtre by their tacit resistance against Moscow,
but now they face the difﬁcult task of locating themselves
amid the tempest of regional realignment of Northern
Europe (Joenniemi, 2007).
1. What are the New Border Regions?
The NBRs are not newly born, but rather reborn, regions;
they had taken shape before the beginning of the twentieth
century, but the Russian Revolution, Cold War, and Sino–
Soviet conﬂict artiﬁcially divided them into Soviet and
opposing camps. After the Cold War, activating economic,
social, cultural, strategic, and military interactions between
the former Soviet Bloc and its neighbors resulted in the
emergence of the NBRs surrounding Slavic Eurasia like
a donut. This paper calls them ‘‘new’’ border regions only
for the purpose of underscoring the differences between
the classic and the revised versions; the latter reemerged
after an interval of more than seventy years.
The border regions of Eurasia in the nineteenth-century
were the focus of international competition, above all,
between the British and Russian Empires. The competition
around these regions created the cradle of modern
geopolitics, represented by Halford Mackinder’s famous
concepts of Heartland and Rimlands (Mackinder, 1919).
Today, the NBRs have become territories of crucial geopo-
litical signiﬁcance again, as is exempliﬁed by the South
Ossetian conﬂict in August 2008. Occupying a huge portion
of land area and population of Eurasia, the NBRs weigh 28
percent and 33 percent of the world oil production and
deposits, and 40percent and53 percent of theworld natural
gas production and deposits, respectively. Twenty-one of
the ﬁfty-ﬁve countries in the world that experienced more
than 7 percent average annual GDP growth during 2000–
2005 are located in the NBRs. During 1990–2006, nineteen
of the ﬁfty-seven cases of regional conﬂict in theworld,with
more than a thousand victims, took place in the NBRs. Over
the last decade, great and regional powers competed
around the issue of how to pierce the NBRs by oil and gas
pipelines. The NBRs experienced environmental catastro-
phes in Chernobyl, Semipalatinsk–Karaganda, and the Aral
Sea and continue to face the difﬁcult task of managing
environmentally vulnerable and hardly recoverable spots,
such as the Okhotsk and Baltic Seas and the Siberian tundra.5 The Institute for Political and International Studies of the Iran MFA
convenes an international conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus
each year; the sixteenth annual conference held on October 28–29, 2008
focused on ‘‘Confrontation in the Caucasus: Roots, Dimensions and
Implications.’’ Seventeen Iranian and thirty-two foreign participants
presented papers.In short, the hopes and miseries of mankind coexist in the
NBRs, and the problem of how we can realize democratic
and effective governance and sustainable development in
the NBRs will signiﬁcantly affect the world’s future.
The crucial importance of these border regions has
attracted researchers’ interest. Most of the popular topics in
recent Slavic Eurasian studies, such as energy and pipelines
(Tabata, 2008), comparative or macro-regional studies of
empires and religions (Akiba, 2007; Miller, 2007; Werth,
2007), and the history of international relations and trade
in Northeast Asia, require viewpoints striding the borders
between Slavic Eurasia and the neighboring regions.
A more compelling example is that one third of graduate
students of the Slavic Division of Hokkaido University, for
whose education the SRC is responsible, are specialized in
the NBRs and therefore oblige themselves to learn
languages outside Slavic Eurasia. Whenwewere young, we
competed around howmany languages in Slavic Eurasiawe
knew, but contemporary young scholars prefer to choose
topics that require the learning of, for example, Chinese,
Korean, Persian, Turkic, and Arabic.6 This implies that we
already have abundant young human resources to promote
NBR studies on the one hand, but on the other, that Slavic
Eurasian and other area studies will inevitably decline, if
scholars stick to traditional division of labor.
NBR studies cannot be a simple extension of existing
area studies. As mentioned above, we need additional
language skills and methodologies beyond the borders
between traditional area studies. During the Cold War, it
was sufﬁcient for Caucasus specialists to have a command
of Russian and a few local languages. Currently, it is desir-
able to know Turkish and Persian additionally for an
understanding of Caucasian politics. Disciplinarily also, we
need to expand our methodological basis by incorporating,
for example, Orientalist expertise. Orientalist knowledge,
for instance, expertise in Islam, will become all the more
important in future Slavic Eurasian studies. Unfortunately,
universities and academic institutes in the world are not
ready to respond to these new challenges. NBR studies have
so far been conducted under individual initiatives. Even
world-leading institutes, such as the Davis Center and the
Kennan Institute, have not launched collective projects
focused on the NBRs. The SRC’s recent initiative for this
purpose did not enjoy the government’s support.
Since NBR countries do not have developed area
studies, one cannot expect local specialists to play
a leading role. Moreover, in comparison with the admi-
rable tradition of the border-crossing approach in histor-
ical studies of Eurasia,7 current analyses of the NBRs,on Islam in the Russian Empire (2006), is running a project on extrater-
ritorialities that the Russian Empire enjoyed in Qajar Iran (2007). Michael
Reynolds, who is a living bridge between Slavic and Near East studies,
recently presented a paper on how the Armenian Revolutionary Federa-
tion (Dashnaktsutiun Party) unfolded its activities striding the borders of
the Russian, Ottoman, and Qajar Empires and criticized the essentialist
notion of inevitable confrontation between Armenian nationalism and
the Ottoman Empire (Reynolds, 2008).
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(see, for example, Lakoba, 2005) or Eurocentric views
(asking, for example, whether the European Union’s
Neighborhood Policy facilitates the democratization of
Eastern Europe).82. Traditional versus cultural geopolitics
It is true that the NBRs, in a sense, are a renewal of the
‘‘inner crescent of Eurasia’’ of the nineteenth century, a ﬁeld
of competition between empires. However, the NBRs in the
twenty-ﬁrst century have important new features, incom-
prehensible by traditional geopolitics (Tuathail, 1996). First,
while nineteenth century border regions were a passive
object of colonial competition between the great powers,
there are twenty-three newly independent and four
unrecognized states in the NBRs,9 which sometimes
manipulate the great powers. Secondly, traditional
geopolitics mainly focused on states, while border-crossing
actors such as religious organizations, NGOs, multinational
corporations and interest groups, and transborder nation-
alities are playing growing roles in NBR politics. Criticism of
so-called realism in international relations studies (or
a state-centered understanding of world politics) has a long
historiography. The realist’s premises that ‘‘states are key
actors in world politics’’ and that ‘‘states can be treated as
homogeneous units acting on the basis of self-interest’’
proved to be intellectually too vulnerable and boring, and
could not but be challenged by liberalists, functionalists,
and constructivists during the 1970–80s (Katzenstein,
1998, 658–659). An unfortunate byproduct of this legiti-
mate challenge was that transnationalism lost its initial
interest in society and culture, since this challenge was
mainly initiated by the ‘‘international political economy’’
school.10 However, since the second, post-ColdWar wave of
transnationalism exploits constructivist methods and
focuses on competition of ideas and ‘‘epistemic communi-
ties,’’ this economic determinism in transnational studies
will soon be overcome.11 Thirdly, traditional geopolitics
measured the military and economic strength of states,
while crafting of cognitive elements (so-called soft power),
such as historical discourse, geographic imagination,
attractiveness of the political regimes, pervasive mass
culture, sports, and cuisine, often affect the balance of
power in the NBRs. Not only the United States and the
European Union, but also China and Islamic countries and8 See, for example, Lankina and Getachew 2006.
9 This essay continues to count South Ossetia and Abkhazia as unrec-
ognized states.
10 If Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1970), who proposed
transnationalism as a new research agenda, covered various transnational
actors, such as religious organizations, trade unions, and revolutionary
movements, twenty-ﬁve years later, Thomas Risse-Kappen et al. (1995)
limited their interest to the activities of multinational corporations and
international non-governmental organizations. Narrowing the object of
research, Risse-Kappen et al. carefully examined under what conditions
transnational (non-state) actors do matter, while criticizing Keohane and
Nye’s zero-sum understanding of relations between transnational and
traditional interstate politics.
11 On the second wave of transnationalism, see Orenstein 2006.even recent Russia12 are spending huge sum of money to
popularize their own spatial perceptions and historical
consciousness (Euro-Atlanticism, Islamism, Neo-Eurasian-
ism, Asian democracy, etc.).
This does not mean that soft power policy is an instru-
ment that homogeneous states or uniﬁed ruling elites
deliberately use. Rather, cultural geopolitics focuses on the
independent actors, including substate ones, that compose
a bureaucratic politics barely controllable by a single
headquarters.13 On the other hand, the understanding by
cultural geopolitics of culture as an operational resource
distinguishes it from the dominant position in interna-
tional relation studies, which often regards culture as
comprising unchangeable behavioral norms (Huntington,
1993).
Fourthly, this competition in soft power is conducted not
so much through direct export of ideologies from the
stronger to weaker countries as through manipulations of
international organizations, such as the EU, Council of
Europe, OSCE, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and
Organization of the Islamic Conference. One may regard
these organizations’ territorial jurisdictions as products of
varying historical and geographic imaginations. The pop-
ulations (at least the intelligentsia) in Central and Eastern
Europe perceived their countries’ EU accession as a ‘‘return’’
to what they once belonged to and ‘‘recovery’’ of historical
justice, violated by Bolshevism. This sense of ‘‘return’’ or
‘‘recovery,’’ even though quite dubious from an objective
historical perspective, functions as a much more powerful
driving force than, for example, a sense of ‘‘innovation’’ or
‘‘development’’ whenpeople imagine newgeographic units.
One should not forget that the vigorous expansion of the
Russian Empire was realized under the banner of
‘‘reuniﬁcation.’’
The four characteristics listed above are not completely
new. Transnational actors and spatial perceptions were
important for the border regions of nineteenth-century
Eurasia as well, but classic geopolitics lacked a vantage
point from which to conceptualize their importance.
Overall, classic geopolitics cannot be a sufﬁcient tool to
analyze the NBRs. We need methods to analyze not only
states but also transnational actors, and not only the
material but also the cognitive inﬂuences of these actors.
This is why we propose a new set of methods classiﬁable
under the name of ‘‘cultural geopolitics.’’ Cultural12 A recent initiative that the Russian government made was the
attempt to establish the ‘‘Russian World’’ ofﬁces, aimed at calling for
interest in Russian language and culture, at prestigious libraries and
universities in the world. The Japanese branch was opened in Hakodate.
13 Skepticism of the existence of a single headquarters in imperial
(colonialist) arrangement has been promoted not only by the school of
bureaucratic politics in international relations studies, but also by
historical studies of empires. For example, Alexei Miller argues that there
was no uniﬁed concept of Russians shared by imperial bureaucrats and
intellectuals in the Russian Empire with the consequence that the
contents of Russiﬁcation policy were always at stake among them
(Mjmmep, 2000). Asano Toyomi maintains that there was no uniﬁed
Korean policy in the Japanese bureaucracy even on the eve of Korea’s
incorporation into the Japanese Empire (1910), which, as Asano regards,
was an outcome of the defeat of Ito Hirobumi’s Korean policy (Asano,
2008).
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empire and religion studies, transborder histories, and
imaginary geography) developed under Program-21. A
common feature of these genres is the endeavor tomobilize
methods of humanities for the social sciences and current
analyses.
The supremacy of the humanities over the social
sciences seems to be a common feature of Japanese area
studies in general. Like it or not, area studies in post-war
Japan have been driven by the humanities, since neither the
government nor business expected much from academic
area studies. Education in the political sciences in Japanese
graduate schools, with a few exceptions, mainly provides
historical expertise, with negligible training in statistics,
which should be indispensable for modern political scien-
tists. The call for cultural geopolitics intends to capitalize on
the merits of Japanese area studies (strong humanities),
rather than to struggle to overcome the weaknesses. This
should be a viable way to make Japanese area studies
internationally competitive. Comparative advantage is not
a rule solely applicable to economics. Furthermore, I will
examine how expertise brought from the booming genres
of the humanities, such as empire and religion studies, can
be exploited for the social sciences and current analyses.3. Historical empires and the contemporary world
During the past decade, we have experienced two
intellectual trends of empires. The ﬁrst is the notion of the
contemporary world as imperial, typiﬁed by a renowned
book coauthored by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
(2000). The unilateral dominance of the United States
(Forsythe et al., 2006) and the rapid growth of the infor-
mation economy (Friedman, 2005) also inspired the idea of
the imperialized world. The second trend is the rising
interest in empires in academic historical studies, exem-
pliﬁed by studies on the composite monarchies of Europe
(Armitage, 1995, 1997, 2000; Canny, 1998; Colley, 1994;
Elliot, 1992; Pocock, 1975; Robertson, 1994) and the North
Eurasian (Sugiyama, 2003; Sugiyama, 2008a, 2008b),
Ottoman, Romanov, and Japanese Empires,14 as well as by
constructivist analyses of the religions and the confessional
relations of empires.15 However strange it is, one can hardly
ﬁnd a link between these two trends. When political
scientists analyze current problems of ethnicity, religion,
and state secession, they rarely refer to historical studies of
empires.16
This situation becomes even more pronounced in
regard to the territories of the former Russian Empire and
the Soviet Union, since historians specialized in these14 See an analysis of the Japanese Empire as a conglomerate of multiple
law territories in Asano (2008).
15 See numerous essays published in Ab Imperio and Kritika: Explorations
in Russian and Eurasian History. An important origin of this approach is
Kappeler 2001, the German original of which was published in 1993.
16 For example, Henry Hale (2008) starts his book on ethnic politics and
secessions by describing his observation of standard norms for ethnic
behaviors, with few references to ethnic histories. I mention this not to
criticize Hale, but to note the different traditions between American and
Japanese political studies on ethnicity.territories have focused on ethnic and confessional rela-
tions and viewed the empire as no more than a back-
ground to these relations.17 Only a minority of historians
(for example, Lieven, 2001; Maxuiato, 2004; Marshall,
2006) have been interested in imperial mechanisms per
se. One cannot ﬁnd a similar overconcentration on ethno-
confessional factors in the studies of the British, Ottoman,
Japanese, or other Empires. This speciﬁc feature of impe-
rial studies of Russia is a result of the coincidence of
several factors: after the liberalization of the Soviet Union,
foreign historians began to enjoy opportunities to explore
local archives in non-Russian territories, and this change
coincided with the period when constructivist methods
ﬂew into the post-Soviet historiography. Understandably,
ethno-confessional issues became good test cases for this
new method. The emphasis on ethno-confessional factors
in Russian imperial studies, potentially, might provide
valuable insights when we examine ethno-confessional
relations developing in the former Soviet Union, but does
not make historical empires a conceptual framework to
analyze the contemporary world. We need, perhaps, to
make the research trend of the Russian Empire closer to
that of other empires, whereby scholars pay more atten-
tion to imperial mechanisms per se.
The socialist period separates the age of classic empires
and the current world. Therefore, we may welcome the
popularity that imperial interpretation of Soviet history
enjoys today (Martin, 2001). This new trend in Soviet
studies might possibly bridge the gap between the two
periods. The Soviet Union was an empire of afﬁrmative
action, which tried not only to ‘‘emancipate’’ nationalities,
but also to designate and demarcate them from above
(Gorenburg, 1999). The intensity of the afﬁrmative action
that these nationalities enjoyed strictly depended on the
prestige of the territorial entities granted to them: union or
autonomous republic, or national district, etc. The Soviet
authorities promoted national historiographies in order to
justify this hierarchy of ethno-territorial formations,
producing and theorizing speciﬁc notions of aboriginality
(avtokhtonnost’) and title nations. The ethno-territorial
formations also tried hard to promote historians recruited
from their title nationalities to justify themselves. Under-
standably, these historians began to look for their ethnic
roots in the ancient past, readily forsaking the Marxist
axiom of nations being a bourgeois (modern) construction.
Despite the apparent accusations of the precedent histori-
ographies, primordial and territorialized notions of nation
consistently strengthened from pre-Revolutionary, Soviet,
and post-Soviet historiography (Uyama, 2002). This is the
reason that a historical dispute could become the prelude
to a bloody civil war in the ruins of the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia (Maxuiato, 2007).
Onlya fewdecadesago, a socioeconomicunderstandingof
empires was predominant. This position was even mildly
Marxist, modernized by Wallerstein’s world-system theory.
Scholars believed that empires were a result of uneven
capitalist development that separated the world into17 Alexander Semenov calls this approach ‘‘empire as context,’’ typiﬁed
by Kappeler, while naming D. Lieven’s position ‘‘empire as instrument.’’
K. Matsuzato / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 42–53 47metropolises and colonies. In other words, these scholars
regarded empires as an attribute of a deﬁnite historical stage,
which should be replaced by a system of nation states, and
distinguishedmodern empires from their precedents. On the
otherhand, empire studies in the last decadehave focused on
institutional and ideational continuities between modern
and premodern empires. The composite monarchy school in
European history emphasizes the medieval origins of the
conceptual and institutional components of composite
monarchies. Specialists ofNorthEurasianempires emphasize
the persistent inﬂuence of the nomad principles of state
building: personal (non-territorial) states modeled after
cavalier battle formation. These historians argue that North/
EastEurasianhistory, at least, since theGreatYuan to theQing
Empire, should be interpreted as a single and consistent
process (Sugiyama, 2008b), criticizing, as a corollary of their
position, the conventional notion of the Qing Dynasty as
a siniﬁed nomad state (Sugiyama, 2003, 2008a).
The imperial understanding of Russian history has
largely been limited to the centuries after Peter the Great.
In fact, however, the future Russia’s imperial core emerged
much earlier, during the thirteenth-ﬁfteenth centuries. The
Mongolian invasion in the ﬁrst half of the thirteenth
century terminated the Kyivan tradition of a federation of
princedoms and in the latter half of the same century,
Danil, the youngest son of Alexander Nevsky, established
the Moscow Princedom. In the mid-ﬁfteenth century,
Russia’s Orthodox Church factually became independent of
the Constantinople Ecumenical Church, in the context of its
resistance to Constantinople’s attempt to unify with the
Roman Catholic Church to be saved from Ottoman assault.
In the same period, the Qipchaq Khanate split into the
Kazan, Astrakhan, Sibir, and Crimean Khanates, the future
acquisitions of Russia. The rudiments of the Russian Empire
were established during these fateful two hundred years on
the very spot where the peripheries of three tradi-
tionsdKyivan Rus, Qipchaq, and the Constantinople
Churchdoverlapped. This extraordinary location blessed
the Moscow Princedom with not only opportunities to
expand to incorporate these historical zones, but also the
discourse to justify this expansion (invasion) as
a ‘‘recovery’’ of the lost lands (in the cases of the former
Kyivan Rus and Qipchaq) or ‘‘succession’’ of declining
authorities (regarding the Constantinople Church). This
was a situation quite similar to the rudiments of the Qing
Empire born exactly on the spot where the Tibetan
Buddhist, Sino-Confucian, and Great Yuan traditions over-
lapped. This location enabled the Manchurians to absorb
these historical zones vigorously.
Thus, during the last decade, all imperial studies of
Europe, Eastern, and Western Eurasia began to pay more
attention to political ideas and institutions, rather than to
the socioeconomic basis of empires, and to interpret
modern empires in their continuity from premodern
precedents. Similar to the intellectual trend in interna-
tional relations studies, ideas and values have come to be
interpreted as resources (rather than norms) that can be
constructed and manipulated. Moreover, researchers,
from global theorist Negri to scrupulous Orientalist
Kiyohiko Sugiyama, began to regard empires as continent-
wide or trans-sea/-ocean interactions, rather thanterritorial state entities, however big they were. Even those
historians who continue to see empires as states empha-
size the lack of deﬁnite boundaries on their fringes.
According to Toshiteru Matsuura, empires are ‘‘another
name for ceaseless struggles to expand their frontiers.’’
Empires’ territorial frontiers are ‘‘constantly obscure and
never ﬁxed, because they are the ﬂuid spheres of conﬂict
between two momentums that expand and push back.
When an empire gains demarcated, visible fringes, it is
even possible to say that this ‘empire’ is already dead’’
(Matsuura, 1997, 51–52). Alfred J. Rieber echoes this
statement: ‘‘Empires differ most strikingly from nation
states in their way of imagining and ﬁxing their bound-
aries. The contrast stems from diverse conceptions of
universalism and power. Imperial ideologies are inspired
by the ideal of universal domination but accept limita-
tions imposed by their own cultural traditions and the
constraints of power politics’’ (Rieber, 2004, 198).
Thus, overexpansion is a crucial attribute of empires.
On the other hand, the intellectual boom of empires has
been driven by widespread disappointment with the
nation state system, incapable of overcoming environ-
mental catastrophes, poverty, illiteracy, HIV, and ethnic-
driven genocide. Previously, people imagined that the
nation state system would replace the system of empires.
But it has become clear that the nation state system, even
putting aside its obsession with homogenization, is an
unrealizable idea, nothing but the ﬂaws of which make
empires indispensable, exactly as the unrealizable ideal of
socialism made black markets unavoidable. The over-
expansion of empires and the unattainable features of the
nation state ideal, combined together, generate
the unexpected negotiation power of peripheral actors
vis-a`-vis imperial cores. It would be unconceivable for
heavily indebted countries, such as Georgia and Moldova,
to twist the United States around their little ﬁnger if the
world were constructed after the model of the nation
state. But in an imperial world, the most indebted can be
the most dictating, because the strongest needs to rule
the fringes of its inﬂuence not only by military and
economic means, but also by values and endless promises,
as a result of which the strongest often becomes a hostage
of its own discourse. This is one of the reasons that the
NBRs have become not only objects of harsh competition
between imperial cores, but also subjects determining
this competition.
Thus, despite the present, unfortunate distance between
historical and current empire studies, if the research trends
described in this sectiondfocus on imperial mechanisms,
interest in socialist empires, the concept of empire as
interaction rather than a territorial entityddevelop, it will
make historical expertise in empires more applicable to
current studies.
4. Religions and politics
The collapse of the Soviet Union discredited the secular
worldview that had been dominant under socialism. The
oppression of religions ended. People visit churches, mos-
ques, and synagogues not only to satisfy their individual
spiritual quest, but also to reinforce their ethnic identity. The
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ling counterproof against the conventional equation of
modernity with secularization, according to which religion
should steadily become a private affair (Casanova, 1994).
However, area study specialists have not been ready to
pay the necessary attention to religions reviving in the
former Soviet Union, perhaps because of inertia from the
Soviet period when religions did not play an important role
in society. One may notice several insufﬁciencies in the
study of religions in the former Soviet territories: lack of
cooperation between various academic disciplines dealing
with religions and between specialists in different religions;
poor conceptions of politics among religion specialists, who
often concentrate on state–religion relations; insufﬁcient
ﬁeldwork and uncritical reliance on historical and human-
ities expertise18; and negligence of the transnational
features of religions, particularly Orthodoxy.
Researchers would seem to have devoted too much
attention to state–church relations (moreover, their
constitutional aspect),19 with the premise that Orthodoxy is
a religion patronized by the secular state and, accordingly,
propagates for its patron. Another premise of this approach
is that Eastern Christianity is authoritarian and anti-civic by
nature (Huntington, 1993; Prodromou, 1996). Recently,
researchers’ concern about Putin–Medvedev’s authori-
tarian tendency strengthened the notion of the ROC as
a lesser ally or even an ideological instrument of the
Russian secular authorities. However, based on the World
Values Survey, Christopher Marsh ﬁnds that devout
believers of the ROC tend to be more democratic and civic
than non-believing Russians (Marsh, 2005). The notion of
the ROC as the secular state’s instrument cannot explain
the fact that Russia is a rare territory in the Orthodox world
that the Pope has not been able to visit (and this was what
Putin yearned to realize). In my view, the relations between
the Russian secular authorities and the ROC are close to an
alliance. Since this issue also concerns the spatial dyna-
mism of Orthodox politics, we will return to it later. In any
case, it is an urgent matter to incorporate as many new
issues as possible into religion studies.20 To widen the
scope of religion studies, we should recruit researchers,
particularly political scientists, into religious studies.
Since 2003, when I launched a project on Islam in
Dagestan, I made constant endeavors to describe the
multiple political functions played by religions. Coauthor M.
-R. Ibragimov, local ethnographer, and I described the Suﬁ18 In Anglo–American countries, specialists in Eurasian Islam would
seem to split between the Orientalists, versed in the theological and
historical aspects of the issue but negligent in the current Muslim soci-
eties of the world, and those who are interested in current Islam from the
viewpoint of conﬂictology and geopolitics, but with poor knowledge of
Islam as a religion. French scholarship has a more sound tradition of
combining theological and political analyses of Islam (for example, see
Peyrouse, 2007).
19 Notonly in regard toRussia, butalsoRomania,Orthodoxyspecialists tend
to concentrateonstate–churchrelations. See, forexample,Andreescu (2007).
20 For example, John and Carol Garrard focus on relations between the
ROC and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, religious leaders’
former collaboration with the security organs, and relations between the
ROC and the Russian Army (Garrard & Garrard, 2007). A. B. Mitrofanova
analyzes Orthodox ‘‘fundamentalism’’ (Mjtpovaooca, 2004).brotherhoods in Dagestan playing pseudo party roles,
representing ethnic, social, and clientelistic interests (Mat-
suzato and Ibragimov, 2005). We also tried to overcome the
conventional conﬂict-driven image of Dagestani politics by
analyzing de facto pluralism realized through competition
among Suﬁ brotherhoods as well as nested social and ethnic
cleavages, which neutralize one confrontation by an alliance
of the same actors in another sphere of life.21 Another
stabilizing factor is the consociational behavior of the elite,
according to which victors try to compensate losers’ loss by
providing them with another concession, rather than
eliminating them (Ibragimov andMatsuzato, 2005). Moving
to Islam in the Ural–Caspian macro-region, I identiﬁed close
ties between the features of Islamic politics in each region
and the regional population’s spatial self-image and the
regional administration’s development strategy (Matsuzato,
2007). In short, I devoted myself to enriching the concept of
politics in religion studies.
Religious politics is characterized by spatial dynamism
or active interactions between various levels, from
communities to international relations. In religious poli-
tics, spatial perceptions of the world, often determining
and determined by the image of co-believers abroad, play
important roles. This is a widely accepted view in regard
to Hasidic Judaism (Akao, 2007) and Islam. For example,
the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Turkey (Diyanet, or
Muslim administration) dispatches lecturers of theology
not only to Sunnite Central Asia, Russian Muslim regions,
and Crimea, but even to Shiite Azerbaijan. Moreover, it
dispatches about twenty imams to Crimea.22 In contrast,
Orthodoxy politics has been interpreted in the context of
caesarpapism (though this is not a canonic term at all, but
an accusatory label, similar to such terms as Stalinism and
Trotskyism), sometimes to the extent that this concept is
confused with the Protestant state church system.23 In
fact, however, the rules of the game in Orthodoxy were
determined by the seven Ecumenical Councils by the
eighth century, when sovereign states were neither
existent nor conceivable. In 2006–2008, inspired by the
fact that Abkhazia and Transnistria are located between
the jurisdictions of the ROC and Romanian Orthodox
Church, I argued that Orthodoxy politics are characterized
by incongruence with secular state borders and are thus
transnational by nature (Matsuzato, 2009).
In Orthodoxy, territorial incongruence between secular
and religious borders sometimes has serious signiﬁcance.21 For example, Russians are Orthodox Christians, the Nogais and
Kymyks practice the Hanaﬁ and Shaﬁi school of Sunna respectively, and
Azerbaijanis are Shiites, but they are allies when they encounter the
massive migration of the Mountain Caucasians (the Avars, Dargins,
Tabasarans, and Lezgins) to lowland Dagestan, though these Caucasians
share the Shaﬁi school of law with the Kumyks.
22 My interview with Mehmet Go¨rmez, vice president of the Diyanet, on
March 29, 2007 in Ankara.
23 It is true that the ROC experienced two centuries of secular control by
the Synod since the Petrine reform of 1721 until the Russian Revolution
and perhaps this is a reason that Constantinople criticizes the ROC as
inherently caesarpapist. However, Peter I0s church reform did not derive
from Orthodoxy per se, but was inspired by his contact with the state
church ideology consolidating at that time in Protestant countries. See
Cracraft (1971, chap. 1).
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diction of the Constantinople Church. Antioch (belonging to
Turkey) continues to be the formal residence of the Patri-
arch of the Syrian Orthodox Church. Recently, the Orthodox
Church of Georgia (OCG) reintegrated Georgia’s historical
region of Tao in northeastern Anatolia into its jurisdiction
after persuading the Constantinople Church and the
Turkish secular government. In fact, it would be a caricature
if the OCG continues to be built in the secular territories
bestowed by the atheist Soviet state and, at the same time,
hoists the slogan of ‘‘inviolable canonic territory’’ to resist
the religious independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Orthodox politics are
characterized by their contradiction with sovereign state
principles. For instance, the ROC can neither recognize nor
incorporate the unrecognized Abkhazian and South Osse-
tian Orthodox Church even if the Russian secular govern-
ment has recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia.24 The
Kyivan Patriarchate, which claimed independence from the
Moscow Patriarchate immediately after Ukraine’s inde-
pendence, has become a huge unrecognized church.
Moreover, including President V. Yushchenko, many people
seem to misrepresent the Kyivan Patriarchate’s argument:
it does not only claim that the state independence of
Ukraine should eventually be followed by Ukraine’s reli-
gious autocephaly; it argues also that the very removal of
the Kyivan Metropolitan See to Vladimir ﬁrst and Moscow
afterwards in the fourteenth century was uncanonic. This is
why the debate between the Moscow and Kyivan Patri-
archates reveals a feature of total war. Recognition of the
Kyivan Patriarchate would imply negation of the whole
history of the ROC. Another example of the transnational
characteristics of Orthodox politics is Moldova, which has
become a ﬁeld of competition between the Russian and
Romanian Orthodox Churches. As a result, relations
between the Russian and Romanian Churches have become
hostile while secular relations between the two govern-
ments remain normal, whereas the ROC and OCG
continued to keep amicable relations even when the two
secular governments warred.
Considering the transnational religious politics described
above, perhaps we need to assume a geographic unit called
Western Eurasia, composed of Western Siberia, European
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and other Black Sea countries,
including Turkey, Caucasus, and Syria. Western Eurasia is
a common stage for border-crossing politics run by Islam and
Eastern Christianity (Orthodoxy and Monophysitism).255. The Black Sea rim as an example of the NBRs
To conclude this essay, let me brieﬂy examine
transborder politics in the Black Sea Rim, a typical NBR,24 If it does so, it will lose legitimacy to criticize the ‘‘violation of canonic
law’’ by the Kyivan Patriarchate and the Romanian Orthodox Church in
Ukraine and Moldova.
25 Historical reconciliation between Orthodoxy and Monophysitism,
which started in the 1990s and continues today, is another factor inten-
sifying transborder politics in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean
Rims. This phenomenon directly affects the Karabakh conﬂict by spiri-
tually consolidating the alliance between Russia and Armenia.by employing the methods of cultural geopolitics
described above. Recently, this region began to attract
worldwide attention because of the South Ossetian
conﬂict in August 2008 and the issue of unrecognized
states in general, the constant instability of Ukraine and
Georgia after the color revolutions in 2003–2004,
growing Islamism in Turkey, pipeline and energy diplo-
macy, the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, and the
IOC’s decision to hold the Winter Olympic Games in
Sochi. However, academic references to this region have
been based, at most, on classic geopolitics, identifying it
as an arena of competition between the transatlantic
alliance and Russia.
A way to view this region more substantially, from
within, is to consider border-crossing political interactions
as its inherent feature. The Black Sea Rim is located
between Eastern Europe and the Near East. In Eastern
Europe, nation building started late, but nevertheless, more
or less stable nations have emerged. In the Near East, reli-
gious and linguistic speciﬁcs have made nation building
extremely difﬁcult and transborder minorities, such as the
Kurds, Maronians, and Alevis, enjoy abundant chances to
split national communities. It is because of this interme-
diary location of the Black Sea Rim that debate on national
formation and state legitimacy often determines the life or
death of states. In Eastern Europe, self-assertions by the
Moravians, Kashubaians, and Samogitians (Lowland Lithu-
anians) do not have a serious impact on the state building
of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Lithuania, while in the
Black Sea Rim, debates aroundMoldavianist historiography
and the existence (or non-existence) of the Mingrelians as
a nationality may directly affect the state building of Mol-
dova, Transnistria, Georgia, and Abkhazia. Poland, at least
ofﬁcially, does not address territorial demands to Lithuania,
Belarus, and Ukraine, while in Romania, not only nationalist
but also liberal parties cannot forsake the slogan of
‘‘restoration of historical Romania.’’
In 1990, both Lithuania and Moldova declared that the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was null and void from the very
date of its signing. The legitimate counterargument that in
this case, Lithuania should return Vilnius to Poland did not
ﬁnd any serious resonance in Lithuania, but in Moldova, the
left bank immediately held a referendum to declare inde-
pendence. In contrast to the Czech Republic and Poland, in
the Black Sea Rim, even overtly pro-American governments
such as those of Georgia and Romania were quite cautious
in recognizing the independence of Kosovo. ‘‘Those who
live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.’’26 It was not by
chance that unrecognized states (Nagorno–Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) could only be
consolidated in the Black Sea Rim, though tens of similar
separatist movements were observed in the last years of
the Soviet Union. If the situation in Eastern Europe is not
conducive to civil war and the opposite is the case for the
Near East, unrecognized states in the Black Sea Rim are
institutionalized civil wars.26 My interview with Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian
Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, on February 8, 2008 in
Tbilisi.
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actors, such as religious organizations, NGOs, transborder
nationalities, and multinational corporations and interest
groups.27 While in Central and Eastern Europe, sovereign
states control border-crossing actors under the guise of
Euroregions (in other words, transnational actors are
promoted because their obedience to sovereign states is
secured), in the Black Sea Rim with the outlook of a classic
sovereign state system, state boundaries are porous. Among
transnational actors operating in this region, NGOs and
transnational corporations have been relatively well
studied. For example, Shinkichi Fujimori (2005) and
Margarita Balmaceda (2007) published excellent studies on
Ukrainian gas traders. In view of the booming political
economy approach to post-Soviet societies, their perspec-
tive seems to enjoy opportunities for further development.
Furthermore, I focus on understudied issues or areas that
are well known but whose transnational characteristics
have been unnoticed: that is, unrecognized states, transb-
order nationalities,28 regional powers, and religions. It is
exactly these factors that make the Black Sea Rim an
attractive test site for cultural geopolitics.
Despite their isolated image, the unrecognized states
have been catalyzing transnational political, ethnic, and
confessional interactions in the Black Sea Rim. The difﬁ-
culties that the populations of these territories face because
of the international blockade do not allow outside co-
ethnicities and co-believers indifferent to this issue. The
large number of widows and orphans caused by the civil
wars at the beginning of the 1990s motivated NGO activi-
ties in these territories. The positions of the elite on this
issue are highly divergent not only in the surrounding
countries, but sometimes in these territories themselves.
For example, there are both pro-Transnistrian and pro-
Moldovan positions in Russia and Ukraine, an overtly pro-
Moldovan position in Transnistria (the Social Democratic
Party under the leadership of Alexander Radchenko), and
a pro-Transnistrian position in Moldova (for example, the
newspaper Moldavskie vedomosti). These varying positions
ally with and confront each other transnationally.29 More-
over, the unrecognized states try to incorporate transb-
order nationalities, such as theMingrelians of Abkhazia and
the Moldovans of Transnistria, into the national commu-
nities, in order to evade international criticism of ethnic27 In the interwar period, leftist parties as branches of Komintern or
Socialist International operated as typical transborder actors. In the
contemporary world, however, many countries have adopted laws to
prohibit or limit parties operating internationally, supposing that such
parties can easily become instruments for intervention in domestic
politics by foreign powers. A typical example is the Armenian Revolu-
tionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun Party), created at the end of the
nineteenth century to liberate Armenians from the three empires,
Russian, Ottoman, and Qajar. Ironically, independent Armenia has often
questioned the legality of this party, international by birth, and actually
repressed it in the late Ter–Petrosyan period.
28 The term ‘‘transborder nationalities’’ is widely used in anthropology,
but not in political science.
29 This should not be regarded as a confusion, but as a sound
phenomenon that binds the actors beyond barriers like Gulliver’s bonds
and limits the possibility of a coercive solution. Understandably, one does
not observe similar nested transnational alliances around the Karabakh
issue, and this implies a much stronger impetus for repeating a war.cleansing, raise the legitimacy of their states, and, if
possible, exploit the ethnic cleavages of their former
suzerains (the status of the Mingrelians in Georgian society
and the confrontation between Moldovanists and pan-
Romanists in Moldova).
Even putting aside the issue of unrecognized states, the
existence of ample transborder nationalities often affects
the politics of the Black Sea Rim. The existence of Transyl-
vanian Hungarians makes the Romanian government show
self-restraint regarding the Kosovo issue. The Hungarian,
Slovak, and Rusyn populations in Transcarphathia make it
difﬁcult for the Ukrainian government to Ukrainianize this
region; only Russian can be the language of interethnic
communication. The Moldovan government used the
Bulgarians in Gagauz as a counterweight to Gagauz sepa-
ratism, while Transnistria succeeded in incorporating
Bulgarians into the national community.
Another fact facilitating transborder politics in the Black
Sea Rim is the existence of regional powers, Russia and
Turkey. During the ColdWar, Turkeywas a stalwart of NATO
in this region. As was the case with Korea, Turkey even
sacriﬁced its democratization towin the ColdWar. Yet after
the Cold War, the European Union invited the former allies
of the opposite camp, not Turkey, whose citizens, under-
standably, felt betrayed. Continuing negotiations for EU
accession, Turkey conducts independent regional diplo-
macy, as exempliﬁed by President Gul’s historical visit to
Armenia in September 2008, immediately after the South
Ossetian conﬂict. Tactfully dodging United States’ opposi-
tion, Turkey endeavors to develop its relations with Iran.
Turkey did not chorus the accusation of Russia after the
South Ossetian conﬂict; it is no secret that MFA leaders of
Turkey dislike Saakashvili even personally. By recognizing
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia succeeded in stopping
the expansion of NATO into the Caucasus. Despite these
facts and despite the more than 7 percent annual economic
growth these countries are achieving, they have not grown
to be amatch for the United States and the European Union.
Unable to defy the transatlantic alliance at the interstate
level, these countries try to expand their inﬂuence by
means of soft power, such as religion, popular and cyber
culture, mobile phone networks, youth movement, and
sports diplomacy.
Religious organizations are one of the oldest transb-
order (transimperial) actors in human history. This is
especially true for the Black Sea, which is an inner sea of
Orthodoxy and Islam. Around this sea, the largest and
second-largest Orthodox churches in the world, Russian
and Romanian, and the oldest, Constantinople, are oper-
ating. Turkey has strong inﬂuence on Muslims in the
former Soviet territories not only because of Hanaﬁ
theology, but also because of its historical advantage in
having provided the Russian Empire with a speciﬁc method
of Muslim administration through a spiritual board (Diya-
net), distinguished from the Arabic theocratic model and
supposedly advantageous for modernization and seculari-
zation of the state.
As I argued above, Orthodoxy is a transnational religion,
more similar to Islam and Catholicism than to the Protes-
tant state church system. This is a natural result of history:
while Protestantism was a twin of the modern sovereign
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remained as such. It is true that the split of the Ottoman
Empire resulted in the split of the Constantinople
Ecumenical Church and the emergence of a number of
national churches, the jurisdiction of which almost over-
laps the sovereign state boundaries. However, one should
not forget that this process required several decades
(for example, it took forty-seven years since the state
independence of Romania for the emergence of the
Romanian autocephaly).
Indisputably, the geopolitical features of the future
Black Sea Rim will be determined by the question of
whether the ROC will repeat the tragic fate of the Con-
stantinople Church. Since the ROC learnt much from the
experience of the Constantinople Church and accumu-
lated theological and organizational know-how for its
own survival even in the case of the demise of its patron,
be it the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, in my view,
it will not easily surrender to split. In the nineteenth
century, pan-Slavic sentiment urged a number of Russian
Orthodox leaders to support the autocephaly movement
in the Balkans, but the other part of the church opposed
it, asking what they should do if the Georgian Orthodox
leaders requested the same (Werth, 2006). In the
twentieth century, the ROC was forced into a protracted
canonic debate with the Ukrainian Autocephalous
Orthodox Church abroad and the Romanian Church,
which, in alliance with Nazi Germany, incorporated not
only Moldova and Transnistria, but also South Ukraine
into its jurisdiction. This protracted experience perhaps
explains why the ROC unilaterally declared the federal-
ization of its organization, raising the status of the
Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Moldovan Churches to
metropolitan sees at the beginning of 1990 (while it was
not too late),30 whereas poor M. Gorbachev would waste
precious time, chattering around the issue of federal-
ization of the USSR until the summer of 1991.
On the other hand, some Ukrainian Orthodox leaders
hurried to create a patriarchate in 1992, without under-
going the necessary procedure for separation from the
mother church, which has not gained recognition in the
Orthodox world. Despite the furious endeavors of Ukraine’s
secular authorities, the Kiyvan Patriarchate has only orga-
nized 2781 parishes and tangibly left behind 9049 parishes,
which have decided to stay under the jurisdiction of the
Moscow Patriarchate.31 None of the Orthodox churches in30 Understandably, leaders of the Kyivan Patriarchate and the Romanian
Orthodox Church criticize these ‘‘autonomies’’ as purely formal and
hypocritical, and characterize the ROC as hypercentralized, as it used to
be before.
31 I rely upon neutral data provided by the RISU/‘‘Religious Information
Service of Ukraine’’ at Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv (http://www.
risu.org.ua/eng/major.religions/orthodox.kp/; http://www.risu.org.ua/eng
/major.religions/orthodox.mp/, accessed December 4, 2008). Taras Kuzio
(2000) indentiﬁes the total sum of parishes under the jurisdiction of the
Kyivan Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephaly Church as 6000,
without noting the source. Even putting aside the fact that Kuzio
underestimates the contradictions between the two national churches,
this number would seem to be unrealistic. According to the RISU, the total
should be 3795.the world, including Romanian and Constantinople rivaling
Moscow, recognize the Kyivan Patriarchate as canonic.
In contrast to the Kyivan Patriarchate, which rushed to
independence and, as a result, failed to be legitimate, the
rivalry between the Russian and Romanian Orthodox
Churches over Moldova, intensifying after 2006, poses
a much more serious challenge to the ROC. In contrast to
the Ukrainian secular authorities, which fully support the
Kyivan Patriarchate, the Moldovan leaders, including pro-
Romanian M. Snegur, recognized the Chisinau–Moldovan
Metropolitan See of the ROC as the only legitimate
Orthodox Church in the country, and persistently rejected
registration of the Bessarabian Metropolitan See (resumed
in 1992) of the Romanian Orthodox Church as a judicial
person. This see sued before the European Court for Human
Rights, which in 2001, ordered the Moldovan government
to register it and materially compensate for the loss that it
suffered during the ten years of rejection. From that time
on, Moldova became a ﬁeld of competition between the
two Orthodox churches.
Thus, all the factors brieﬂy described in this section,
Orthodoxy, Islam, transborder nationalities, unrecognized
states, and regional powers, facilitate transnational politics
in the post-Cold War Black Sea Rim.
6. Conclusions
The NBRs, emerging after the Cold War, are of vital
importance for mankind, and have academic potential to
enrich the humanities and social sciences signiﬁcantly.
Unfortunately, area study communities in the world have
not been ready to respond to this challenge, but continue to
limit their scope according to the artiﬁcial division of labor
created during the Cold War.
One cannot understand geopolitics in the twenty-ﬁrst
century solely through the prism of military, economic, or
othermaterialmeans. Rather, cognitive crafting plays all the
more crucial a role in determining geopolitical competition.
This is especially true for the multiethnic and multiconfes-
sional NBRs, in which various geographic and historical
imaginations compete. Learning from the most progressive
spheres in the humanities, such as imperial and religion
studies, transborder history, and imaginary geography, we
might create a set of approaches called cultural geopolitics.
To include booming empire studies in the arsenal of
cultural geopolitics, we ought to bridge historical and
current empire studies by focusing on imperial mecha-
nisms, deepening the study of socialist empires, and
conceptualizing empires as interactions, rather than state
entities. By all appearances, the twenty-ﬁrst century is
becoming a century of religions. In particular, it is difﬁcult
to overemphasize the importance of religions in the
geopolitics of the NBRs. The massive participation of
researchers of various disciplines in the study of religions
will break its traditional narrow scope and make religion
studies an indispensable subgenre of area studies.
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